diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index fb7e72b..b0d5eae 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -5,6 +5,27 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [Unreleased]
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **User Git Configuration Reaches Git**: `EnvironmentPolicy` filtered out every
+  variable git uses to locate the operator's configuration, so the spawned
+  process could not read `~/.gitconfig`. Git fell back to inventing an identity
+  from the system account and hostname, and commits were attributed to addresses
+  such as `user@laptop.local` that exist nowhere and verify against nothing,
+  while the operator's configured identity sat unread on disk. `HOME`,
+  `XDG_CONFIG_HOME`, `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL` and `USERPROFILE` now pass through.
+
+  Locating configuration is not the same as injecting it: `GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS`,
+  `GIT_EXEC_PATH` and `GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR` remain blocked, so a caller still cannot
+  push settings into the process directly.
+
+  Callers that relied on git being unable to see user configuration — expecting a
+  fixed synthetic author, or an environment where `core.*` settings could not
+  apply — will observe different behavior and should pass `GIT_AUTHOR_*` /
+  `GIT_COMMITTER_*` explicitly, which continue to take precedence.
+
 ## [3.2.0] - 2026-07-19
 
 ### Added
diff --git a/src/domain/services/EnvironmentPolicy.js b/src/domain/services/EnvironmentPolicy.js
index fa41767..dc64941 100644
--- a/src/domain/services/EnvironmentPolicy.js
+++ b/src/domain/services/EnvironmentPolicy.js
@@ -3,16 +3,26 @@
  */
 
 /**
- * EnvironmentPolicy defines which environment variables are safe to pass 
+ * EnvironmentPolicy defines which environment variables are safe to pass
  * to the underlying Git process.
- * 
- * It whitelists essential variables for identity and localization while
- * explicitly blocking variables that could override security settings.
+ *
+ * It whitelists essential variables for identity, configuration discovery and
+ * localization while explicitly blocking variables that could override security
+ * settings.
+ *
+ * The distinction it draws is between letting git *find* the operator's
+ * configuration and letting a caller *inject* configuration. The first is
+ * ordinary git behaviour: without it git cannot read ~/.gitconfig, invents an
+ * identity from the system account and hostname, and writes commits attributed
+ * to an address that exists nowhere and verifies against nothing. The second
+ * stays blocked, because GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS and friends push settings into
+ * the process directly rather than pointing at a file the operator owns.
  */
 export default class EnvironmentPolicy {
   /**
    * List of environment variables allowed to be passed to the git process.
-   * Whitelists identity (GIT_AUTHOR_*, GIT_COMMITTER_*) and localization (LANG, LC_ALL).
+   * Whitelists identity (GIT_AUTHOR_*, GIT_COMMITTER_*), the paths git uses to
+   * locate user configuration, and localization (LANG, LC_ALL).
    * @private
    */
   static _ALLOWED_KEYS = [
@@ -28,6 +38,14 @@ export default class EnvironmentPolicy {
     'GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL',
     'GIT_COMMITTER_DATE',
     'GIT_COMMITTER_TZ',
+    // Configuration discovery: where git looks for the operator's own config.
+    // HOME finds ~/.gitconfig, XDG_CONFIG_HOME finds ~/.config/git/config,
+    // GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL names the file outright, and USERPROFILE is how a home
+    // directory is resolved on Windows.
+    'HOME',
+    'XDG_CONFIG_HOME',
+    'GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL',
+    'USERPROFILE',
     // Localization & Encoding
     'LANG',
     'LC_ALL',
diff --git a/test/UserGitConfig.test.js b/test/UserGitConfig.test.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bf35ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/UserGitConfig.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+import GitPlumbing from '../index.js';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import os from 'node:os';
+
+/**
+ * A caller that shells out through this library should see the same identity
+ * git itself would use.
+ *
+ * The runner sanitizes the environment before spawning git. When that filter
+ * drops every variable git uses to locate the user's configuration, git cannot
+ * read ~/.gitconfig at all and manufactures an identity from the system account
+ * and hostname instead. The result is a commit attributed to an address like
+ * user@laptop.local, which exists nowhere, verifies against nothing, and quietly
+ * replaces the identity the operator actually configured.
+ *
+ * This drives a real commit with the configuration supplied the ordinary way and
+ * asserts the configured identity survives the filter.
+ */
+describe('User git configuration', () => {
+  let repoPath;
+  let homePath;
+  let originalHome;
+  let originalConfigGlobal;
+
+  const CONFIGURED_NAME = 'Configured Operator';
+  const CONFIGURED_EMAIL = 'operator@example.com';
+
+  beforeAll(() => {
+    const stamp = Math.random().toString(36).substring(7);
+    repoPath = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `git-plumbing-userconfig-repo-${stamp}`);
+    homePath = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `git-plumbing-userconfig-home-${stamp}`);
+    fs.mkdirSync(repoPath, { recursive: true });
+    fs.mkdirSync(homePath, { recursive: true });
+
+    fs.writeFileSync(
+      path.join(homePath, '.gitconfig'),
+      `[user]\n\tname = ${CONFIGURED_NAME}\n\temail = ${CONFIGURED_EMAIL}\n`
+    );
+
+    originalHome = process.env.HOME;
+    originalConfigGlobal = process.env.GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL;
+    process.env.HOME = homePath;
+    delete process.env.GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL;
+  });
+
+  afterAll(() => {
+    if (originalHome === undefined) {
+      delete process.env.HOME;
+    } else {
+      process.env.HOME = originalHome;
+    }
+
+    if (originalConfigGlobal === undefined) {
+      delete process.env.GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL;
+    } else {
+      process.env.GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL = originalConfigGlobal;
+    }
+
+    fs.rmSync(repoPath, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    fs.rmSync(homePath, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('commits as the identity the operator configured', async () => {
+    const git = await GitPlumbing.createDefault({ cwd: repoPath });
+    await git.execute({ args: ['init'] });
+
+    const tree = await git.execute({ args: ['write-tree'] });
+    const commit = await git.execute({
+      args: ['commit-tree', tree.trim(), '-m', 'configured identity']
+    });
+
+    const author = await git.execute({
+      args: ['log', '-1', '--format=%an <%ae>', commit.trim()]
+    });
+
+    expect(author.trim()).toBe(`${CONFIGURED_NAME} <${CONFIGURED_EMAIL}>`);
+  });
+});
diff --git a/test/domain/services/EnvironmentPolicy.test.js b/test/domain/services/EnvironmentPolicy.test.js
index a3a99e4..7075471 100644
--- a/test/domain/services/EnvironmentPolicy.test.js
+++ b/test/domain/services/EnvironmentPolicy.test.js
@@ -54,4 +54,44 @@ describe('EnvironmentPolicy', () => {
     expect(EnvironmentPolicy.filter({})).toEqual({});
     expect(EnvironmentPolicy.filter(undefined)).toEqual({});
   });
+
+  // Without a way to locate the user's configuration, git cannot read
+  // ~/.gitconfig and falls back to inventing an identity from the system
+  // account and hostname. Callers then see commits attributed to addresses
+  // such as user@laptop.local that exist nowhere and verify against nothing,
+  // while the operator's real, configured identity sits unread on disk.
+  it('lets git locate the user configuration', () => {
+    const env = {
+      HOME: '/home/operator',
+      XDG_CONFIG_HOME: '/home/operator/.config',
+      GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: '/home/operator/.gitconfig'
+    };
+
+    const filtered = EnvironmentPolicy.filter(env);
+
+    expect(filtered).toEqual(env);
+  });
+
+  it('passes USERPROFILE so Windows callers resolve a home directory too', () => {
+    const filtered = EnvironmentPolicy.filter({ USERPROFILE: 'C:\\Users\\operator' });
+
+    expect(filtered.USERPROFILE).toBe('C:\\Users\\operator');
+  });
+
+  // Reading configuration is not the same as accepting arbitrary overrides.
+  // GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS injects settings directly into the process and stays
+  // blocked, so a caller cannot smuggle configuration past the policy.
+  it('still refuses direct configuration injection', () => {
+    const filtered = EnvironmentPolicy.filter({
+      HOME: '/home/operator',
+      GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS: "'user.name=attacker'",
+      GIT_EXEC_PATH: '/tmp/evil',
+      GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR: '/tmp/evil'
+    });
+
+    expect(filtered.HOME).toBe('/home/operator');
+    expect(filtered.GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(filtered.GIT_EXEC_PATH).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(filtered.GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR).toBeUndefined();
+  });
 });
\ No newline at end of file