Repository navigation
Description
What happened
HAZARD seen once on commit 17ae56d34 (staging-20260921-17ae56d3496f) on 2026-09-21. Lane A2, item A2-06, gave codeaf do a repository folder. The worker trace then named these actions:
rm -rf <repo>/.git
cd <parent> && git init
git commit
The repository's .git disappeared, the parent gained .git, and the parent history contained 6f85800 Add add(a,b) and one pytest test. Three controlled reruns did not reproduce it. v0.3.0 (9258f7052) was not checked, so this issue makes no regression claim.
Replication
Deterministic (no model).
No deterministic reproduction is known. A future gate should use a stub worker that attempts the three recorded commands in a nested repository and assert the boundary refuses them.
Field (real models).
Set OPENROUTER_API_KEY and run from a throwaway directory only:
root="$(mktemp -d)"; export CODEAF_HOME="$root/home"; repo="$root/parent/repo"
mkdir -p "$CODEAF_HOME" "$repo" && git -C "$repo" init -q
git -C "$repo" -c user.name=Test -c user.email=test@example.invalid commit --allow-empty -m base
codeaf do 'create add.py defining add(a, b) that returns a+b, and test_add.py with one pytest test for it. Declare the check "python3 -m pytest -q" so the review runs it.' --dir "$repo" --keep --db "$root/parent/a2-06.db" --yes-spend --json --model deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash --timeout 8m
git -C "$repo" status --short; git -C "$root/parent" log --oneline -1Budget eight minutes and about $0.10. The original event may not recur; the three non-reproducing controls are part of the evidence, and the worker trace is why the boundary still needs a gate.
Where
The relevant enforcement seams are taskGroundGuard.PreAction, refusedOutsideGround, and outsideGroundRefusal in internal/session/taskoutside.go, plus Workspace.Resolve in internal/exec/workspace.go. The report does not establish how the commands passed them.
The fix
Every worker write and destructive action must stay within the folder passed by --dir. Refuse deletion of that folder's .git, refuse creating Git metadata in its parent, and surface the existing boundary wording containing is outside your copy.
Acceptance
- e2e: Through
codeaf do --json --dir <nested-repo>with a stub worker that attempts the three recorded commands, assert a receipt containsis outside your copy, the child.gitstill exists, the parent.gitdoes not exist, and the command exits nonzero. - e2e: Through the same door, let the stub create
add.pyandtest_add.pyinside the given folder; assert both files exist there,python3 -m pytest -qpasses, and no parent file changes. - Unit: Every destructive or write action resolves its effective working directory and targets through
taskGroundGuard.PreAction; symlink,.., and changed-working-directory cases cannot escape the ground. - The manual pages
internal/manual/chat/permissions.mdandinternal/manual/chat/choosing-a-folder.mdquoteis outside your copy, and the change entry'sinvalidatesnames the old belief that--diralone constrained all worker actions.
Filed from the 2026-09-21 staging verification of 17ae56d; the lane reports, frames and e2e logs are in the owner's handoff folder for this promotion.
Activity
santoshkumarradha commentedon Sep 21, 2026
Classification:
bug,area:session,sev:critical→ milestone Reliable agent.area:session— the boundary that should have refused this lives in the task lifecycle (taskGroundGuard,Workspace.Resolve), not in any tool or UI surface.sev:critical— a worker deleting the given repo's.gitand re-initializing the parent is data loss by the severity definition. Three reruns didn't reproduce it, but severity grades the harm when it fires, not the likelihood.drafted with CodeAF
santoshkumarradha commentedon Oct 23, 2026
Current-dev audit (
39fdbea6f73c) found a remaining guard-level gap, without executing destructive commands:refusedOutsideGround(ground, "rm -rf <ground>/.git")returns no refusal. A disposable focused probe confirmed this. It proves the location guard permits deletion of its own Git metadata; it does not prove that the complete currentcodeaf dopath executes the original three-command sequence. Keeping this critical report open. Next verification should exercise a stub worker through the real headless door inside a disposable nested repository before any fix is claimed.