Ravage is an evidence-first CLI for assessing a running web application that you own or are explicitly authorized to test. It combines deterministic reconnaissance and validation with an optional model-driven attack loop, while keeping scope, authentication, traffic accounting, and evidence in code-owned boundaries.
Illustrative local XBEN run; paths and lifecycle options vary by preset.
Ravage is a pre-1.0 research alpha. Use disposable environments and a written rules of engagement. Security testing can change application state; Ravage does not remediate findings or deploy fixes.
Quickstart · Live demo · Authentication · Results · Capabilities · Documentation
- Python 3.12
- Git
- macOS, Linux, or WSL
- Docker for process-capable model-driven attacks, containerized tools, XBEN, and integration tests
- A provider API key only for model-driven commands
The normal first scan needs no model key, browser, Docker daemon, or external scanner.
git clone https://github.com/duriantaco/ravage.git
cd ravage
scripts/bootstrap.sh
source .venv/bin/activate
ravage doctorThe bootstrap creates .venv and installs the workspace. Use
scripts/bootstrap.sh --dev for development dependencies,
--browser for browser support, or
--install-browser to install Chromium as well.
Start your application first. This example assumes it is listening on
http://127.0.0.1:3000.
-
Create a scoped engagement brief and private environment file:
ravage init http://127.0.0.1:3000 \ --brief ravage-brief.yaml \ --env-file .env.ravage \ --description "Authorized assessment of my local development app." -
Review
ravage-brief.yaml. Check the target, in-scope routes, exclusions, request budget, rate limit, objectives, and success criteria. -
Run a no-model surface scan:
ravage doctor --workflow scan --brief ravage-brief.yaml ravage scan ravage-brief.yaml --probe surface_map --report
The command prints the run directory. Copy that path and use it as
RUN_DIR in the inspection commands below.
Add a supported provider key, such as OPENAI_API_KEY, to
.env.ravage. Ravage reads this file directly; do not shell-source
it.
ravage doctor --workflow attack --brief ravage-brief.yaml
ravage attack ravage-brief.yaml --allow-paid-models --reportFor an application checkout you are authorized to test, opt into source-guided validation with a local Python source directory:
ravage attack ravage-brief.yaml \
--source-root /path/to/application \
--allow-paid-models \
--reportThis mode maps bounded Flask and FastAPI route-to-sink flows locally, adds only
structural metadata to the attack surface, and automatically validates only
statically bound, non-mutating GET/query SQL-injection hypotheses whose complete
scalar query shape is known. POST, body, form, path, dynamic, and relatively
bound candidates remain prioritization hints. Traversal is capped by files,
bytes, directories, and directory entries; included source that exceeds a cap
fails closed. Hidden, temporary, version-control, virtual-environment,
dependency, cache, and build directories are excluded and reported. These
exclusions and static matches are not live proof: Ravage still requires
differential runtime
evidence. The private source map contains structural identifiers such as route
and input names, relative file paths, and line numbers; a bounded subset is
sent to the configured model. Source snippets, function bodies, unrelated
constant values, and absolute source paths are not stored or sent.
Dynamic routes, unsupported route or direct-flow patterns, skipped symlinks,
and files that cannot be parsed can reduce coverage; the run records that
coverage as incomplete instead of claiming a clean result. Here,
analysis_complete means every included file parsed and every
recognized bounded pattern was handled. It is not a claim of whole-program
coverage. Resume requires the same source snapshot, analyzer contract, and
candidate map.
For read-only review across UTF-8 source, configuration, and documentation files, use the separate repository-review agent:
ravage review /path/to/applicationIt can autonomously list files and omissions, search text, and request bounded
excerpts from one frozen snapshot. It has no target, shell, browser, probe, or
project-execution tools. Results are model-authored source-review candidates with
references generated from exact captured excerpts. The JSON keeps paths, lines,
excerpt and file digests, and the snapshot identity; it does not persist the raw
snapshot. The default model profile is local; selecting a hosted profile requires
--allow-paid-models and sends requested source context to that
provider. See
Offline Repository Context.
--allow-paid-models is an explicit acknowledgement that the run
can incur provider charges. Model selection, local providers, and reproducible
profiles are documented in Model providers.
Unauthenticated process-capable attacks use Docker by default. Ravage never
silently falls back to host execution. The explicit
--tool-runtime host option runs model-selected shell and Python on
your machine; use it only in a disposable localhost environment. Child
processes receive a minimal environment without provider keys, but explicit
host execution can still read files available to your user account.
Hosted models receive the engagement brief, selected discovered state, prior findings, and tool observations that may include target response data. That information leaves your machine and is handled under the provider's terms and retention controls. Do not use a hosted route for sensitive customer or production data unless the engagement permits that disclosure. Use a local model route when target evidence must remain local.
For a short live demo, set XBEN_ROOT to the benchmarks
directory in an XBEN checkout, start Docker, and export
OPENAI_API_KEY. Then run:
ravage demo xbenRavage builds a fresh local XBEN-009 target, attacks it with the pinned
GPT-5.4 high profile, scores the result, saves the evidence under
runs/demo, and removes the target and its local image. The preset
limits the run to ten model requests, ten turns, ten minutes, and $1.50.
For a live domain-name demo, Ravage can assess HCL AppScan's deliberately
vulnerable TestFire banking site. HCL publishes
demo.testfire.net as a dynamic scanning sample.
Review that authorization, export OPENAI_API_KEY, and explicitly
acknowledge the remote target:
ravage demo testfire --authorized-remote-targetThis command cannot accept another hostname. It permits only the curated login routes, GET/HEAD plus the login POST, and a code-owned set of harmless login values; stacked, destructive, and time-delay payloads are rejected before dispatch. It also disables process, scanner, recovery, and autonomous lanes, caps the whole run at 24 physical requests and 0.5 RPS, and stops after one non-destructive, evidence-backed finding. The target is a shared public demo and may occasionally be unavailable or reset by its operator.
Add a dedicated test identity to the brief:
ravage auth add ravage-brief.yaml \
--identity user \
--type form \
--login /login \
--health /account \
--marker Logout \
--env-file .env.ravageFill in the generated secret references, verify the session, then attack with the selected identity:
ravage auth check ravage-brief.yaml --identity user
ravage attack ravage-brief.yaml \
--identity user \
--allow-paid-models \
--reportForm login, bearer tokens, and fixed static headers are supported. Managed credentials stay inside the authenticated HTTP owner; process, Python, and command lanes are blocked when an identity is selected. See Authentication for setup and limitations.
With at least two configured identities, first map which read-only routes each role can see:
ravage auth map ravage-brief.yaml \
--identity alice \
--identity bob \
--include-anonymousThe map follows a small, deterministic GET-only frontier across every selected identity. It records conservatively shaped routes and parameter names, not exact URLs, response bodies, or query values. Recognized IDs and ambiguous path segments become placeholders. A difference is only a review candidate; it is not a vulnerability claim.
Confirm a reviewed, operator-supplied resource with the authorization matrix:
ravage auth matrix ravage-brief.yaml authorization-matrix.yamlThe plan names each explicit GET URL, its allowed and denied actors (including
anonymous), and a secret-backed response marker. Ravage does not discover or
guess resource IDs. See the
authentication guide for map
safety limits, the matrix plan format, receipt boundaries, and limitations.
Remote execution is fail-closed and requires an explicit flag. Start with a low-impact surface scan:
ravage init https://staging.example.test \
--brief ravage-brief.yaml \
--env-file .env.ravage \
--description "Authorized assessment of my staging application."
ravage doctor --workflow scan \
--brief ravage-brief.yaml \
--authorized-remote-target
ravage scan ravage-brief.yaml \
--probe surface_map \
--authorized-remote-target \
--reportFor a model-driven remote run:
ravage attack ravage-brief.yaml \
--authorized-remote-target \
--allow-paid-models \
--reportAuthorized remote attacks default to the whole-run low-noise policy: native metered HTTP only, sub-1-RPS pacing, a physical-request ceiling, conservative GET/HEAD caching and deduplication, adaptive backoff, bounded retries, and circuit breaking. The durable ledger survives resume. Details are in Architecture.
Ravage distinguishes observations, candidate findings, and confirmed vulnerabilities. A CTF flag is one possible proof, not a requirement. On an ordinary application, a run can be useful and successful without finding any flag; confirmed vulnerabilities are still written to the report.
Once an attack run starts, its canonical private machine-readable artifact is
RUN_DIR/report.json, including incomplete runs.
--report also writes RUN_DIR/report.md.
ravage observe RUN_DIR
ravage audit verify RUN_DIR
ravage report RUN_DIR --brief ravage-brief.yamlFor structured HTTP captured by the agent graph:
ravage traffic list RUN_DIR
ravage traffic show RUN_DIR REQUEST_IDThe report includes evidence references, request-accounting quality, completion
status, and the reason an incomplete run stopped. Missing or unreadable expected
evidence makes the report incomplete; an empty incomplete report has Unknown
risk. Never treat an unvalidated model assertion as a confirmed finding.
ravage observe prints a private, temporary access link. The observer requires
authenticated requests for run data and actions and binds to loopback by default.
| Capability | Entry point | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Deterministic recon and probes | ravage scan |
No model required |
| Model-driven assessment | ravage attack |
Evidence-gated and scoped |
| Source-guided validation | ravage attack --source-root |
Local Flask/FastAPI mapping; live proof required |
| Read-only repository review | ravage review |
Frozen multi-language text context; source-backed candidates |
| Managed authentication | ravage auth |
Sessions, role-aware map, authorization matrix |
| Traffic inspection and replay | ravage traffic |
Scoped artifacts |
| Knowledge skills | ravage skills, ravage code-bug |
Advisory |
| Passive SATCOM inspection | ravage satcom inspect |
No transmit |
| Curated live demos | ravage demo xben, ravage demo testfire |
Local XBEN or scope-locked HCL TestFire target |
| XBEN evaluation | ravage xben |
Docker-based research harness |
| Improvement Lab | scripts/improvement_lab.py |
Isolated archive |
Knowledge skills can guide prioritization, but cannot add tools, expand scope, or confirm findings. Start with:
ravage skills list builtin
ravage skills validate builtinThe Improvement Lab ingests sanitized prior-run structure, evaluates candidate patches in independent workspaces, archives accepted and rejected versions, and requires matched no-regression evidence before promotion. Promotable receipts must trace back to separately signed, archived execution evidence. It is a sidecar: it does not mutate the source checkout or silently promote itself.
Passive orbital and packet artifacts can be inspected separately:
ravage satcom inspect orbit.tle --format tle --output orbit-report.json
ravage satcom inspect capture.bin \
--format ccsds-space-packets \
--direction auto \
--output packet-report.jsonSATCOM support is passive parsing and analysis, not a radio transmitter or spacecraft-control system.
scripts/bootstrap.sh --dev
source .venv/bin/activate
python -m pytest -m "not integration" -q
python -m ruff check --select E9,F .
python scripts/qa/check_docs.py
python scripts/qa/check_release.pyDocker-backed integration tests and frozen XBEN comparisons are separate release gates. Read Benchmarking before interpreting case results; one lucky flag is not evidence of a reliable improvement.
- How to use Ravage
- Setup and troubleshooting
- Authentication
- Architecture
- Skills
- Passive SATCOM
- Improvement Lab
- Benchmarking
- Security policy
- Contributing
Use ravage --help and ravage COMMAND --help for the
exact options in your checkout.
Apache License 2.0. See LICENSE, DISCLAIMER, and SECURITY.md.
