Please report security issues privately, not as a public GitHub issue.

• Preferred: GitHub private vulnerability reporting on this repository.
• Alternative: email contact@iknaio.com with SECURITY in the subject.

Please include enough detail to reproduce: affected version or commit, the component (library, REST API, CLI, MCP server, Python client), a proof of concept, and the impact you believe it has. If you have a suggested fix, we are glad to see it, but a clear report is far more valuable than a patch.

We publish a GitHub Security Advisory for every accepted finding, request a CVE where one applies, and credit the reporter unless they ask us not to. We will tell you before an advisory goes public. If a fix will take longer than the targets above, we will say so rather than let the report go quiet.

We do not operate a paid bug bounty.

Security fixes land on the latest released minor version of the 2.x line and are published to PyPI as graphsense-lib. Older minor versions do not receive backports; please upgrade before reporting an issue against one.

In scope:

• The Python library and CLI (graphsenselib).
• The REST API application (graphsenselib.web) and the MCP server.
• The published Docker images and their default entrypoints.
• The generated Python client under clients/python/.

Out of scope — these are expected, documented behaviours rather than defects:

• Authentication and rate limiting are delegated to the API gateway. graphsenselib.web.security.get_api_key extracts the Authorization header but deliberately does not validate it; a deployment is expected to front the application with a gateway (we use APISIX) that enforces credentials, quotas and per-client rate limits. Reports that an endpoint is reachable without a valid API key when the application is run bare are not treated as vulnerabilities on their own — but reports of an endpoint whose cost is disproportionate to the request that triggers it are, whether authenticated or not.
• Findings that require access to the Cassandra cluster, the tagstore database, or the configuration file. Those are trusted inputs; anyone holding them already holds the data.
• Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies without a demonstrated impact on this project. Please report those upstream; we track dependency advisories through Dependabot.
• Anything that requires a user to run an untrusted graphsense.yaml, tagpack or plugin. Configuration and plugins are code, and are trusted as such.

The stock container is safe to run as shipped, but a production deployment should additionally:

• Terminate TLS and enforce API keys and rate limits at the gateway.
• Keep the gateway's own request body limit at or below the application's max_request_body_bytes (default 8 MiB).
• Lower max_bulk_items (default 10,000) if the deployment serves untrusted callers and does not need long bulk requests.
• Run the REST API with a memory limit and more than one worker, so a single expensive request cannot take the service down.