Do not open a public issue or pull request containing an unpatched vulnerability, exploit details or secrets.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting. Begin with a brief summary in the private report and agree on a suitable transfer method before sending sensitive material. Do not send production credentials or substitute a public issue.

Include:

• Affected version and build (for example 3.0 (3)), iOS version, device class, installation/signing method and actual backend.
• Impact, prerequisites and minimal steps using synthetic/test data.
• Carrier/transport and relevant network conditions, without real IPs, private room IDs or identifying provider/account details.
• A sanitized log excerpt or minimal proof of concept; specify what you observed versus what you infer, and whether the issue reproduces consistently.
• Whether you can help validate a fix and a preferred contact method.

Allow time to investigate and coordinate disclosure before publishing details. Do not test against other people's devices, accounts, VPS instances or carrier infrastructure without permission. No response deadline, bounty or resolution SLA is promised.

This policy covers the olcOS 3.0 iOS codebase and the shared Go core in this repository, including app integration, the packet-tunnel extension, local proxy, SSH provisioning, imports, storage and diagnostic exports. Project · architecture. No security-maintenance commitment is made here for older builds or planned Windows and macOS clients. Android app reports use the same private channel; name the Android version and build.

Report routing leaks, authentication bypasses, secret exposure, unsafe script construction, host-key validation defects and misleading security state. If a defect is in the underlying core, coordinate with upstream olcrtc through its own security guidance; do not publish it to upstream's ordinary issue tracker. For uncertain ownership, start with the private reporting channel above.

SSH uses trust on first use (TOFU). The first server key is remembered automatically for the original host and port, including connections through a local SOCKS relay; later connections compare against that saved key. No manual fingerprint entry or independent-verification checklist is required. SSHHostKeyVerification · SSHRunner.

Initial trust is the limitation: TOFU cannot detect an impersonator already present on the first connection. It checks continuity afterward, not independent ownership of the first key. Start on a connection you trust.

A changed key triggers a warning and rejects the connection. An expected server rebuild or key rotation requires explicit confirmation to reset saved trust before reconnecting; the next connection establishes trust again. Unexpected changes should not be dismissed, and keys are never silently replaced during a retry. Host-key policy · reset interface (shown on “Manage server” only after a mismatch) · trust store.

The SSH route can retry directly when a relay is unavailable: SSH management is not guaranteed to remain inside olcOS, although the same host-key continuity check still applies. SSH transport · dial policy.

SOCKS5 mode covers explicitly configured clients, not every app. Automatic starts VPN-first and permits SOCKS5 fallback only for recognized NE permission/capability failures after stop/cleanup, not ordinary network, carrier or key failures. Explicit VPN never silently downgrades. TunnelManager · mode policy.

The VPN packet path carries IPv4 TCP. IPv6 is captured and dropped; UDP DNS is truncated to encourage TCP retry and other UDP is dropped. Provider-originated sockets use the underlying network; includeAllNetworks is deliberately not enabled. These are implementation boundaries, not a guarantee that no traffic can ever leave directly. PacketTunnelProvider · tunstack.

There is no universal kill-switch, anonymity, carrier invisibility or unblockability claim. Consider traffic before connection, after disconnection, during OS failure and outside configured proxy clients. The VPS, carrier, resolver and destination remain separate trust boundaries.

Persistent connection secrets use Keychain; the helper requests AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly. Connection keys, SOCKS passwords and provider tokens are excluded from the connection model's ordinary encoded form. KeychainHelper · ConnectionSecretStore · OlcrtcConnection.

VPN is an explicit exception to a “Keychain only” claim. During startup and the session, the room key and provider token pass through providerConfiguration in system VPN preferences. The controller attempts to blank them after the tunnel is down and serializes cleanup with future starts; a failed preference save or interrupted cleanup can leave persisted secrets. There is no shared-Keychain/App-Group handoff here. VPNConfig · VPNController.

After successful cleanup, start a new session from the app; a cold start from iOS Settings cannot recover those cleared credentials and is rejected. Do not keep plaintext profile secrets merely to enable external restart. Provider startup validation.

Connection URIs and QR codes expose the room key. Treat subscription URLs, device invite links and exported configuration as sensitive too. URI guide.

The app implements log redaction, but no pattern-based filter can guarantee that every secret or identifier is removed. Inspect exports and screenshots before sharing; remove real IPs, full URIs, QR codes, credentials, room IDs, subscription tokens and identifying account data. LogStore · LogExport.

The hero picture (beam and stone wall) is not evidence that packets are flowing, a speed measurement or a security indicator, even though its pace follows measured tunnel throughput. Use actual diagnostic results with their route and timestamp, and do not infer universal connectivity from one success. Motion policy · diagnostics.

The project makes no claim to protect a compromised/jailbroken device, malicious VPS, stolen account or untrusted third-party carrier. These limits do not make a reproducible app defect unreportable.